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From the biological
perspective, the act of suicide is a puzzle. Although animals will occasionally
refuse to eat (or, in the case of marine mammals, beach themselves) because
they are ill, and appear prepared to ªght to the death to protect their young, no
parallel to human patterns of suicide is easily found in the natural world.1
Among humans, it is primarily young adults who commit suicide; otherwise,
generalizations are hard to make. In the West, more young males succeed in
taking their own lives, whereas in China, it is young females who commit sui-
cide more often.2 Most suicides result only in the death of the individual who
commits the act or those involved in a murder-suicide. There is, however, a
distinct subcategory of individuals who commit suicide that is most puzzling
of all—the suicide terrorist. The suicide terrorist’s aim appears not only to die
but to kill as many others as possible to advance a political objective. This form
of suicide is most closely associated with Islamic terrorism, though it does play
a role in a few other terrorist movements, including the recently defeated
Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.
In this article, we argue that the life sciences can offer insights into suicide
terrorism in the Islamic context. We argue that suicide terrorism as a cultural
practice could not exist without it intersecting at some point with evolutionary
motivations. To approach this topic, we must ªrst consider the signiªcance of
suicide terrorism in the Islamic context to the contemporary international
system.
Sex and the Shaheed
Sex and the Shaheed Bradley A. Thayer
and
Valerie M. HudsonInsights from the Life Sciences on Islamic
Suicide Terrorism
Bradley A. Thayer is Professor of Political Science at Baylor University. Valerie M. Hudson is Professor of
Political Science at Brigham Young University.
The authors would like to thank Roger Masters, Rafe Sagarin, Terence Taylor, and the participants
in the Darwinian Homeland Security group, especially Dominic Johnson, Kevin Lafferty, Kather-
ine Smith, and John Tooby, for their support and insightful comments. They would also like to
thank the anonymous reviewers for their exceptional comments and offer special thanks to S. Mat-
thew Stearmer, who rendered the polygyny map. Thayer thanks John Friend, Erin McClelland,
and Jason Wood for their research assistance, and the University of California Press for permission
to draw on his chapter from Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor, eds., Natural Security: A Dar-
winian Approach to a Dangerous World.
1. The classic study of human motivations for committing suicide is Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A
Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding and ed. George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1997).
No evidence exists that animals commit suicide. On suicide in the animal world, see Dennis
Chitty, Do Lemmings Commit Suicide? Beautiful Hypotheses and Ugly Facts (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1996).
2. World Health Organization, WHO Statistical Information System database, 2007, http://www
.who.int/whosis/en/index.html.
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For at least a decade before the suicide terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, Islamic suicide terrorists had repeatedly attacked U.S. interests both at
home and abroad, including the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center
and, in 1998, attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa. Nevertheless, the U.S.
government did not make suicide terrorism per se a focus of U.S. national se-
curity policy. After September 11, however, the United States adopted a more
robust counterterrorism policy. U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan, the Horn of
Africa, Indonesia, Iraq, the Maghreb, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, the
Sahel, and Thailand, as well as in European states, have done much to weaken
the most notorious Islamic group using suicide terrorism against the West,
al-Qaida.3
Yet, even if al-Qaida is diminished, Islamic fundamentalist suicide attacks
will continue to be executed by al-Qaida-inspired groups, Palestinian terror-
ist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Taliban because they are an
effective asymmetric tactic against some of the world’s most hardened secu-
rity forces. Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorists have penetrated British,
French, Israeli, and U.S. defenses, among others. Moreover, only suicide terror-
ists could have executed the September 11 attacks or penetrated the Israeli se-
curity corridor bordering the Palestinian Authority, because they alone could
navigate the countless security obstacles and be capable of self-destructing at
a precise location and time while causing the greatest damage. As Mustafa
Alani puts it, “It’s what we call a thinking, walking bomb. He watches the
whole scene [and] chooses the best time and best location.”4 Suicide terrorism
is the ultimate smart bomb, demonstrating unparalleled political commitment
and personal resoluteness.
Scholars have examined Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism primarily
through the lens of international politics, economics, and cultural studies, and
each offers important insights into the motivation and recruitment policies of
groups that practice it. There is, however, another discipline that can make a
useful contribution—the life sciences. We argue that the application of con-
cepts and approaches from the life sciences yields new insights into (1) the
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3. Although al-Qaida is the most well known Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization, it is
far from the only one. In fact, it is best to conceive of a family of groups, of which there are about
forty directly afªliated with or trying to imitate al-Qaida. The most dangerous of the groups are
principally based in and recruit in Europe and pursue targets in Europe, Russia, and Central Asia;
these groups include al-Takªr wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and Exile); the Salaªst Group for
Preaching and Combat (known by its French acronym GSPC); and Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami
(Islamic Party of Liberation).
4. Mustafa Alani, director of security and terrorism studies at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai,
quoted in Patrick Quinn, “U.S. Draws Portrait of Iraq Bombers,” Associated Press, March 15, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-03-15-1207869913_x.htm.
causal context of Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism, (2) the motivation
of suicide terrorists, and (3) policy approaches to subvert this form of terror-
ism. A consilient approach, incorporating ideas from the life sciences and the
social sciences, can aid social scientists and policy analysts in addressing
the problem of Islamic suicide terrorism.5 The life sciences can be a source of
new analogies and examples that might help scholars and analysts to ap-
proach the problem in fresh ways and derive effective policies.6
Our argument is important for three reasons. First, understanding the moti-
vations of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists is critical for creating policies to
stop them, ideally before they become terrorists. Second, our approach helps
to illuminate why few Islamic fundamentalist terrorists defect and how poli-
cies may be crafted to promote defections. Finally, it advances the goal of
consilience—that is, using insights from human evolution and ecology, as well
as from the social sciences, to create a more comprehensive and detailed un-
derstanding of human behavior. In essence, consilient approaches bridge the
gap between the life sciences and the social sciences. For the advancement of
knowledge concerning human behavior, there may be no more important task
than removing the barriers between the life sciences and the social sciences,
which we believe will revolutionize both ªelds of study.7
The article begins with a discussion of the conditions that social scientists
have traditionally identiªed in seeking to explain Islamic fundamentalist sui-
cide terrorism. We then apply ªndings from the life sciences to help deepen
these traditional explanations. We suggest that high levels of gender differ-
entiation, comparatively high levels of polygyny, and obstructed marriage
markets in Islamic societies introduce additional powerful forces whose
logic must be probed by those seeking to understand and undermine Islamic
terrorism.8 Finally, we offer several recommendations for countering Islamic
suicide terrorism.
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5. Evolutionary theorist and entomologist Edward O. Wilson ªrst called attention to the value of
the consilient approach in Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Vintage, 1999).
Bradley A. Thayer adopted this approach to study war and ethnic conºict. See Thayer, Darwin and
International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conºict (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2004).
6. See, for example, Robert H. Sprinkle, “The Cult in Power Politics: Evolution of a Devotional
Weapon,” paper presented at the Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Association for Politics
and the Life Sciences, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 11, 2007.
7. Indeed, in an otherwise exceptional compilation, there is no mention of life sciences in Diego
Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide Missions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
8. Every analysis has its boundaries, and this article is no exception. We do not attempt to explore
all of the causes of suicide terrorism in the Islamic context, or why states sponsor terrorism, or the
myriad of motivations that might lead individuals alternatively to support terrorist groups short
of suicide terrorism. These issues are important to study and can be informed by the life sciences,
but they fall outside the scope of this article. For considerations, see Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The
Conventional Explanations for Islamic Terrorism
Social science scholars have argued that three factors are responsible for the
rise of Islamic suicide terrorism: international anarchy, U.S. hegemonic inter-
vention in Islamic societies, and fundamentalist Islamic belief systems.
International politics is anarchic, with no governmental authority above the
level of the state in international politics. This is the key difference between
domestic politics, where there is typically hierarchic government, and inter-
national politics, where there is none to adjudicate disputes and provide pro-
tection for citizens.9 The anarchic condition of the international system fosters
an environment where war or human rights abuses are always possible. The
lack of international governance also permits the persistence of failed states, in
which sovereignty is contested by different political factions. In the 1990s, for
example, al-Qaida established a presence in the failed state of Sudan. Similarly,
the failed state of Afghanistan under the Taliban permitted al-Qaida to ºour-
ish; to train a new generation of terrorists; and to become the threat it, its spin-
offs, and related groups are today.
U.S. hegemony is a second conventional explanation for the rise of Islamic
terrorism. As the only remaining superpower at the end of the Cold War, the
United States became the world’s military, economic, and ideological leader.
The unmatched power of the United States allows it to use military force and
support allied regimes the world over—including in the Islamic world, caus-
ing deep resentment.
In 1990, for example, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait resulted in the United States
basing forces in Saudi Arabia and signiªcantly expanding its military presence
in the Persian Gulf. A consistent rationale that Islamic fundamentalist terror-
ists have used in defending their actions has been to eliminate the U.S. military
presence in the Islamic world, especially in Saudi Arabia (home to Islam’s
most important religious sites) and expose the United States for the vulnerable
and degenerate hegemon they believe it is. Progress toward this objective was
achieved shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when permanently stationed
U.S. forces were withdrawn to other locations in the Persian Gulf. Since the in-
vasion, Islamic fundamentalist terrorists have redoubled their efforts to force
the United States from the region.
Another rationale for Islamic fundamentalist terror attacks centers on
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Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); and Olivier Roy, Globalized Is-
lam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 42–54, 247–289.
9. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979),
pp. 114–116.
the Arab world’s “apostate” regimes. To protect its worldwide interests, the
United States has established a network of alliances in the Middle East—from
Morocco to the Gulf sheikhdoms and from Turkey to the Horn of Africa and
Somalia. Islamic fundamentalist terrorists view these alliances as testament to
the heretical and hypocritical nature of the governments behind them. Indeed,
most Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is directed against these governments
and their supporters—what the jihadists call the “near enemy”—who are re-
viled because they are seen as apostates who have rejected Islam, embraced a
secular ideology, and allied with the United States, the so-called far enemy.10
Until al-Qaida started to attack the United States in the 1990s, the country
had rarely been the target of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. In the 1980s,
Hezbollah attacked U.S. forces in Lebanon for nationalistic, not religious, rea-
sons. The rationale for al-Qaida’s attacks against the United States, its military,
and its allies ºows not only from its grand strategic goal of forcing the United
States to withdraw militarily from the Middle East but also from its desire
to terminate support for U.S. regional allies. Al-Qaida’s lasting contribution to
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism was to target the “far enemy” before target-
ing the apostate regimes. Deprived of U.S. support, the apostate regimes
would fall, and the Islamic community would become pure.
A third conventional explanation concerns how a narrow, fundamentalist
interpretation of the religion of Islam provides inspiration, justiªcation, legiti-
mation, and political and cultural support to suicide terrorism. Islamic funda-
mentalist terrorists justify their actions based on Salaªyya or Wahhabism,
which are fundamentalist interpretations of the Koran and sunna (or hadith),
the sayings and traditions of the prophet Mohammed.11 Many Islamic scholars
dispute the terrorists’ interpretation of Islam, but for the terrorists and many of
their sympathizers, the dispute is irrelevant.12
Islamic terrorists point to the explicit scriptural approbation of suicide in the
Koran as justiªcation for their suicide attacks. Islamic suicide terrorists are
considered shaheeds, who die as martyrs for Allah.13 Mohammed himself be-
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10. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), pp. 43–79, 119–184; and Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Re-
sistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 187–190.
11. There is no single Salaª movement or sect. Analyses that provide insight into Salaªyya and
Wahhabism include Ahmad S. Moussalli, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest
for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999); and
Hamid Algar,Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta, N.Y.: Islamic Publications International, 2002).
12. The literature on an evolutionary explanation of religious beliefs is well developed. Perhaps
the best analysis is provided by David Sloan Wilson, whose work allows scholars to understand
how religion meets human needs. See Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature
of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
13. According to Raphael Israeli, shaheed can have three meanings: “a martyr who died for the
seeched his followers to distinguish themselves in battle so they could enjoy
the considerable rewards reserved only for shaheeds. According to one hadith,
a shaheed “will be pardoned [for his sins] by Allah, will take his place in
Paradise, will be dressed with the Cloth of Faith, will marry beautiful-eyed
young women, will be spared the torments of the tomb, will not submit to the
Day of Judgment, and will have one of the world’s best precious stones adorn
his crown.”14 In paradise, shaheeds will enjoy other rewards reserved only for
them.
It may be tempting to dismiss these beliefs as incredible, but students of
suicide terrorism do so at their peril. As one expert has written, “There is
no doubt . . . that for Muslims whose pursuit of jihad is an active and prepon-
derant aspect of their lives, particularly so among the Palestinians, the ques-
tion of reward in Paradise constitutes a crucial portion . . . of their worldview
and plays a major role in their battle motivation.”15 This is evidenced in
“the Palestinian press and the death announcements of martyrs, which are
usually pre-recorded in person by the [suicide terrorist] and then kept as part
of the cultivated patrimony of martyrdom . . . there is no mincing of words; in-
deed, there is boasting, desire, expectations and impatient eagerness to take
the short cut and join in one stroke the pleasures of Paradise.”16
In sum, international anarchy, U.S. hegemonic involvement in Islamic states,
and fundamentalist Islamic belief systems (including the explicit approbation
of suicide in narrow interpretations of Islamic scripture) are the conventional
foundation for Islamic suicide terrorism. In the sections that follow, we discuss
additional explanations grounded in the life sciences that do not detract from
these conventional explanations, but rather augment and deepen the explan-
ations offered.
Young Adult Males and Insights from the Life Sciences
All of the major religions developed in a resource-scarce ecology.17 For this
reason, most major religions historically promoted a dominance hierarchy
(explicit or de facto), which scholars in the life sciences have argued enhances
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sake of Allah; the fallen in the jihad; or a Muslim who experienced suffering before a tragic death.”
Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 74. In this arti-
cle, we use the ªrst meaning exclusively.
14. Quoted in Raphael Israeli, “The Promise of an Afterlife Motivates Suicide Terrorists,” in Lauri
S. Friedman, ed., What Motivates Suicide Bombers? (Detroit, Mich.: Greenhaven, 2005), p. 38.
15. Israeli, Islamikaze, p. 218.
16. Ibid., p. 218.
17. We contend that certain behaviors, which would be reºected in religious beliefs, would tend to
evolve in an anarchic, resource-scarce environment and that these behaviors might last longer in
relatively isolated parts of the Muslim world, such as the Arabian Peninsula, where societies
group survival.18 Individuals in resource-scarce environments have difªculty
accessing potable water; food; productive land; housing in safe, relatively
disease-free locales; and access to mates. Even in the twenty-ªrst century, re-
source scarcity shapes the cultures of at least 80 percent of the human species.
The ªtness-enhancing aspects of dominance hierarchies in the context of re-
source scarcity, therefore, cannot be overlooked.
Seen through the lens of evolutionary theory, a dominance hierarchy typi-
cally includes individuals in social groups who have regular priority of access
to resources.19 The creation of this hierarchy may be accompanied by and
maintained through the use of violence, producing a competitive social sys-
tem. Most social mammals live in an organization with a single leader, the al-
pha male, who leads the group and controls its resources. The ubiquity of this
behavior among social mammals strongly suggests that this form of organiza-
tion contributes to species ªtness. Ethologists argue that dominance hierar-
chies evolved because they help to defend their members against predators,
promote the harvesting of resources, and reduce intragroup conºict.20 Domi-
nance hierarchies can also produce a concomitant feeling of empowerment—
of belonging to a dynamic, strong organization—which, as John Tooby has
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sought little contact with the outside world, than in more cosmopolitan parts of the Muslim world,
such as Algiers, Istanbul, and Jakarta.
18. Such promotion can be seen most clearly in the historical entanglement between religious and
political power in Judaic, Christian, and Islamic societies. On the role of dominance hierarchies,
see L.L. Betzig, Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History (New York: Al-
dine, 1986); David F. Bjorklund and Anthony D. Pellegrini, The Origins of Human Nature: Evolution-
ary Developmental Psychology (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2002),
pp. 268–270, 289–290, 293–294; Robert A. Hinde, Biological Bases of Human Social Behaviour (Dallas,
Tex.: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Thayer, Darwin and International Relations, pp. 71–72; Richard Wrangham
and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (Boston: Houghton
Mifºin, 1996), p. 199; and Richard W. Wrangham, “Evolution of Coalitionary Killing,” Yearbook of
Physical Anthropology, Vol. 42 (1999), pp. 1–30.
19. Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985).
20. Joseph Lopreato, Human Nature and Biocultural Evolution (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984);
Donald L. McEachron and Darius Baer, “A Review of Selected Sociobiological Principles: Applica-
tion to Hominid Evolution II: The Effects of Intergroup Conºict,” Journal of Social and Biological
Structures, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1982), pp. 121–139; and K.E. Moyer, “The Biological Basis of Domi-
nance and Aggression,” in Diane McGuinness, ed., Dominance, Aggression, and War (New York:
Paragon, 1987), pp. 1–34. Stanley Milgram also notes the importance of what he terms “dominance
structures.” He argues that the “potential for obedience is prerequisite of . . . social organization.”
See Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row, 1974),
p. 124. Many people in Milgram’s famous experiments deªned themselves as “open to regulation
by a person of higher status. In this condition the individual no longer views himself as responsi-
ble for his own actions but deªnes himself as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of others”
(p. 134). Ethological studies have conªrmed that a hierarchical dominance system within a pri-
mate band minimizes overt aggression and that such aggression increases when the alpha male is
challenged. For an excellent overview, see Bruce M. Knauft, “Violence and Sociality in Human
Evolution,” Current Anthropology, Vol. 32, No. 4 (August–October 1991), pp. 391–409.
noted, is particularly attractive to males.21 Joining or even supporting a social
group, if that group appears more efªcacious than other organizations in soci-
ety, results in individuals feeling more powerful.
Although membership in a social group can offer substantial rewards, these
are not distributed equally in dominance hierarchies. The behavior of males, in
particular, is fundamentally shaped by their status ranking within the group.
A small group of elite males holds power and controls access to resources,
while preventing a larger group of subordinate males from accessing those re-
sources. Non-alpha males who live in a tight dominance hierarchy will con-
stantly look for ways in which they can have an impact or call attention to
themselves to increase their social status and attractiveness as mates within the
group, as a prelude to one day achieving alpha status themselves. Among so-
cial mammals, non-alpha males will also look for opportunities to change
the social hierarchy in their favor, including furtive mating and the use of
violence.
The tension between group solidarity and reproductive success is thus a key
feature of social mammalian groups. Evolutionary biologists posit that both
forces are enormously powerful in motivating human behavior. In addition
to being drawn to “ªt” social groups—successful dominance hierarchies—
mammals seek to maximize their individual reproductive success. The key to
reproductive success for a male in a dominance hierarchy is, well, domi-
nance.22 The logic is inescapable: non-alpha males are the prime candidates for
reproductive failure, and thus are the prime candidates for social unrest in any
human group.
Evolution explains why non-alpha males, and principally adolescent or
young unmated males, are attracted to ideologies that promote the use of force
and promise to reshufºe the players in a dominance hierarchy.23 Success in us-
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21. John Tooby, remarks at the Darwinian Homeland Security workshop, National Center for Eco-
logical Analysis and Synthesis, Santa Barbara, California, December 10, 2005.
22. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations, pp. 71–75.
23. Motivations for female suicide terrorism tend to differ from those for male suicide terrorism.
Among these motivations are (1) the female is not married or she is a widow, and her enemy killed
her loved ones; (2) she is married but about to be disenfranchised from society and her loved ones;
she is about to be divorced by her husband or has just been divorced by her husband; she is barren
(and about to be divorced as a result); she loses custody of her children; or she has been caught en-
gaging in adultery and will be killed; (3) her body has been mutilated, making her unmarriageable
(or is mentally defective and thus unmarriageable); and (4) she is young, unmarried, and attracted
to the gender equality preached by certain ideological movements—but these are seldom Islamic
movements (e.g., the Tamil Tigers). There is also the case of a plain, overweight, young woman
whose husband married her with the explicit intent of turning her into a suicide bomber a few
days later. She backed out of the plan at the last minute, but her husband detonated his bomb, kill-
ing himself and many others at the Radisson Hotel in Amman, Jordan. For additional insights, see
Karla J. Cunningham, “Cross-National Trends in Female Terrorism”; and Terri Toles Patkin, “Ex-
plosive Baggage: Female Palestinian Suicide Bombers and the Rhetoric of Emotion,” both in
ing force, whether against out-groups or in-groups, can overcome lack of
status for a non-alpha male. It also signals to alpha males that they may not be
victorious in a future intragroup battle.
Alpha males try to resolve this inevitable tension through male bonding. By
persuading non-alpha males that they are all “family,” alpha males may be
able to dampen intragroup tensions. Evolutionary psychology also helps to ex-
plain why this strategy will be effective. Humans evolved in small-group
dominance hierarchies—principally the family and extended family hunter
groups. Accordingly, the human mind is well suited for comprehending and
bonding with small groups of dozens or, at most, 100 or 150 people.24 To be
sure, humans may bond with larger units (e.g., a country), but that requires an
extensive effort by the state (e.g., years of nationalistic education). In mimick-
ing the family bond, male-bonded groups often assume the task of educating
young males, providing another family-like service. Young people often em-
brace indoctrination into a belief system through a religion or an educational
system, or the combination of the two, such as in madrassas.25 Emulating the
family also makes the male-bonded group more resilient—harder to penetrate
and to destroy—similar to the family or the maªa and suggests they must be
targeted in unique ways.
The dynamics described above are found among all societies, not only those
of the Islamic world. Alpha males will seek to co-opt non-alpha males into
male-bonded societies in which violence is controlled by alphas and guided
toward out-groups, not in-groups (and especially not targeted toward the
alphas). In this study, however, we limit ourselves to examining factors that
we argue contribute to Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism. Of course,
even within the Islamic world, individuals will possess other motivations to
conduct suicide attacks. For example, there is evidence that at least some Iraqi
male teenagers have been forced to train as suicide bombers under fear of re-
prisals against their families.26
Gender Differentiation and Young Adult Muslim Males
Some analysts have raised the possibility that Islamic conceptions of gen-
der differences and the extreme differences in the way the sexes are treated
contribute to the virulence of Islamic terrorism. Indeed, some scholars are be-
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Thomas J. Badey, ed., Violence and Terrorism, Annual Editions, 08/09 (Boston: McGraw-Hill Educa-
tion, 2009), pp. 150–165, 166–175.
24. Tooby, remarks at the Darwinian Homeland Security workshop.
25. Roy, Globalized Islam, pp. 92–97.
26. See Kim Gamel, “6 Teens Forced to Train for Suicide,” Washington Times, May 27, 2008, http://
www.washtimes.com/news/2008/may/27/6-teens-forced-to-train-for-suicide/.
ginning to explore whether the rationalization of terrorism is related to the ra-
tionalization of violence against, and oppression of, women. Regarding the
differences between Western culture and radical Islamic culture, Jean Bethke
Elshtain, for example, states, “We underestimate the centrality of the gender
question at our peril.” She goes on to say that “gender practices are not a
sidebar to the war against terrorism as a cultural struggle, but a central is-
sue.”27 Some analysts have proposed a direct link between terrorism and the
treatment of women, suggesting that young men brought up in isolation from
women in accordance with rigid gender status beliefs, such as existed in
Afghanistan under the Taliban, have perpetuated an environment of ex-
tremism.28 Pundits such as Charles Krauthammer opine, “On Sept. 11, 2001,
America awoke to the great jihad, wondering: What is this about? We have
come to agree on the obvious answers: religion, ideology, political power and
territory. But there is one fundamental issue at stake that dares not speak its
name. This war is also about—deeply about—sex. For the jihadists, at stake
in the war against the inªdels is the control of women. . . . Jihadists, like all to-
talitarians, oppose many kinds of freedom. What makes them unique, how-
ever, is their particular hatred of freedom for women.”29 The life sciences, we
argue, help to explain the linkage Krauthammer suggests between gender and
terrorism in Islamic culture.
First, among twenty-ªrst-century cultures, Islamic cultures are noted for
their high levels of gender differentiation. Gender is a primary conceptual cat-
egory in every human society. In certain societies, however, it takes on more
prominence as an organizing category. High gender differentiation tends to be
a hallmark of deeply authoritarian cultures or, to put it in other terms, strong
male-dominance hierarchies.30 In an empirical analysis, Steven Fish debunks
the notion that Islamic societies are disproportionately involved in conºict or
disproportionately suffer from authoritarian rule.31 Rather, he cites two indica-
tors that he claims better explain the variance of these variables in the Islamic
world: overall sex ratio and the literacy gap between males and females.
Fish ªnds that models incorporating these two variables are signiªcantly cor-
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27. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), pp. 38, 40.
28. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).
29. Charles Krauthammer, “Abu Ghraib as Symbol,” Washington Post, May 7, 2004.
30. L.L. Betzig, “Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Cross-Cultural Correlation of
Conºict Asymmetry, Hierarchy, and Degree of Polygyny,” Ethology and Sociobiology, Vol. 3, No. 4
(1982), pp. 209–221.
31. M. Steven Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1 (October 2002),
pp. 4–37.
related to authoritarianism in Islamic countries. He hypothesizes that female
oppression—one of the earliest social acts observed by all members of the
society—provides the template for other types of oppression, including au-
thoritarianism. His work conªrms that of other scholars who have shown a
strong and signiªcant correlation between the oppression of women and
authoritarianism.32
Highly gender differentiated cultures are an important context in which to
understand the use of violence by males: these are cultures in which males be-
come hypervigilant about feelings of emasculation or humiliation. High levels
of gender differentiation, historically a common feature in human societies, are
less common in the twenty-ªrst century. Some societies have profoundly miti-
gated the natural male-dominance hierarchy, whereas others have continued
to embrace this model. High levels of gender differentiation and violence
against women help us to identify unmitigated cases. Most, though not
all, Islamic societies fall into the “unmitigated” category, with Middle Eastern
Islamic nations having the highest scores of all in quantitative studies.33
Second, Islamic nations not only have less power than the United States, but
they must tolerate U.S. economic, diplomatic, and even military involvement
in their domestic and regional affairs. As a result, young adult males in these
societies feel a keen sense of emasculation and humiliation. Without any com-
pensating social status, these young men, in particular, have a strong cultural
imperative to ªnd some means to address these emotions.34
Third, though the concepts of honor and virility may be hard for a Western
academic audience to comprehend, given the largely successful efforts to erase
them from dominant discourses in Western societies, masculinity has traction
in other societies, none more so than in Muslim societies. Honor-based socie-
ties often situate honor in the persons of their women. Honor killings, for ex-
ample, almost always involve the killing of women for sullying the honor of
their male kin. The bodies of women, then, are the subject of masculine anxiety
in such societies. For example, according to Shalom Harrari, a former Israeli
intelligence ofªcial in charge of the occupied territories until 2000, the sight
of Israeli soldiers searching Palestinian women was unbearable to other
Palestinians: “Basically, if we touched a woman to search her, we touched her
honor, which in turn implicated her family, and eventually the entire village
felt it was their responsibility to defend her honor. In the end, the soldiers
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found themselves confronting the civilian population over the honor of their
women.”35
Indeed, while honor and shame are prime motivating forces in many socie-
ties, the conºuence of high gender differentiation and situational emasculation
puts Middle Eastern Islamic nations at high risk for in-group male push-
back against a humiliating international dominance hierarchy—especially
among young, non-alpha males. Nathaniel Fick, a former Marine Corps pla-
toon leader in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, reports that all Iraqi social
groups welcomed liberation from Saddam Hussein except males in their twen-
ties and thirties, who believed that the Marines did what the Iraqis could not—
rid their country of a tyrant. As a result, they felt emasculated.36 Accordingly,
though seldom acknowledged, the context of Islamic societies with respect to
gender differentiation and the emotions of young males is a predisposing fac-
tor for terrorism.
Polygyny and Islamic Suicide Terrorism
The inequitable distribution of resources across male cohorts in primate
groups that form dominance hierarchies creates serious, often violent, compe-
tition when these resources are scarce. This is especially true regarding the
scarcity of mating partners. Polygynous primate groups have the highest level
of social violence, because the monopoly of females by elite males threatens
non-alpha males with complete reproductive failure.37 In evolutionary terms,
the threat of complete reproductive failure is highly motivating, especially
for the subpopulation of young adult males.
As a religious and cultural practice, polygyny contributes to the scarcity of
mates for non-alpha males. Generally, if one male has multiple wives and birth
sex ratios remain approximately 50-50, fewer females will be available for the
remaining males. Males without mates will have to resort to extraordinary
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acts to increase their social status to allow them to attract a mate. Men with
multiple wives may likewise have to resort to extraordinary acts to reinforce
the social order that favors them over other men. As Alan Miller and Satoshi
Kanazawa put it, “Across all societies, polygyny makes men more violent,
increasing crimes such as murder and rape, even after controlling for such ob-
vious factors as economic development, economic inequality, population den-
sity, the level of democracy, and political factors in the region.”38 Islam,
unlike Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Confucianism, or any other major
religion, continues to defend polygyny. The uniquely Islamic contempo-
rary practice of polygyny adds a level of scarcity simply not found in the
Western Hemisphere, non-Islamic Asian nations, or Europe. Only in sub-Saha-
ran Africa is there a comparable practice of polygyny, with its attendant soci-
etal instability (see ªgure 1).39 Yet, while certainly suffering from high levels of
societal violence as predicted, non-Islamic African societies do not share the
belief that suicide promises reproductive success in paradise.
Baldly put, polygyny means mates for some men and none for others. And
who will not obtain mates? It will not be those with advantages, but rather
those who lack them. Non-alpha males will be the reproductive losers,
and this gives them great motivation to use force, the sole area in which they
possibly hold a reproductively relevant advantage over alpha males.
Alpha males and non-alpha males understand the ramiªcations of polygyny
for their relations: polygyny will heighten in-group violence against alpha
males by non-alpha males absent a mechanism that directs this violence to an
out-group. From the perspective of alpha males, suicide terrorism offers some
interesting possibilities. A non-alpha male in a polygynous society with high
levels of gender differentiation wants to ªnd a way to project power, prefera-
bly through violence. In this way, he hopes to obtain greater social status and
thus greater reproductive success. An alpha male in the same society wants to
ªnd a way to channel that violence to out-groups without allowing the non-
alpha male to achieve social status through violence, which ultimately could
threaten the interests of the alpha males. Suicide terrorism, sanctioned and ap-
plauded by religious belief, represents an attractive strategy in this context. If
alpha males can persuade non-alpha males that (1) their violence should be di-
rected to out-groups, (2) that thereby these non-alpha males will greatly in-
crease their social status and make their families proud, but (3) they will have
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to die and experience their reproductive success vicariously through their kin,
or in the afterlife, then the threat of in-group violence can be decreased.
For some non-alpha males, becoming a shaheed is the most effective response
to the human evolutionary conundrum produced by male dominance hierar-
chies, high levels of gender differentiation, and the scarcity of females result-
ing from polygyny.40 In 2003 Robert Pape found that among Islamic suicide
terrorists, 97 percent were single and 84 percent were male. If one excludes the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which promotes gender equality, the gender ratio
rises to 91 percent.41 These young men come predominantly from lower socio-
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Figure 1. Prevalence of Polygyny in the Islamic World, circa 2007
SOURCE: WomanStats Database, http://womanstats.org, accessed December 17, 2009.
NOTE: States ranked have a plurality or majority Muslim population.
economic strata of society than those involved in nonsuicide terrorism, despite
the somewhat anomalous case of the September 11 attacks. Evolutionary psy-
chology would predict that this subpopulation would be most susceptible to
the lure of suicide terrorism.
Islamic religious texts promise the shaheed seventy-two virgins in the after-
life.42 Miller and Kanazawa note, “It is the combination of polygyny and the
promise of a large harem of virgins in heaven that motivate many young
Muslim men to commit suicide bombings. Consistent with this explanation, all
studies of suicide bombers indicate that they are signiªcantly younger than
not only the Muslim population in general but other (nonsuicidal) members of
their own extreme political organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. And
nearly all suicide bombers are single.”43
Failed suicide bombers may not admit to this temptation as motivation for
their action, perhaps considering it too vulgar or impious. Nevertheless, it can
be a key draw for a male contemplating poor reproductive prospects in this
life. In March 2004, Husam Abdu (also Abdo), a sixteen-year-old failed suicide
bomber captured at an Israeli checkpoint in Gaza, explained to Israeli intelli-
gence ofªcials that his dwarªsm made him the object of ridicule at school, and
he had been tempted by the promise of sexual relations with virgins in para-
dise.44 Another captured would-be suicide terrorist, a Moroccan man, aged
twenty-six, suffered from facial disªgurement.45 A study of suicide bombers in
Iraq conducted by the U.S. military found that they were almost always single
males from eighteen to thirty, with a mean age of twenty-two and no chil-
dren.46 The study concluded that most are “alienated young men from large
families who are desperate to stand out from the crowd and make their
mark.”47
Hypergyny in polygynous culture is another reason why some young men
experience low status. Poor, higher-birth-order young men from large families
are at high risk for reproductive failure in such societies and must resort to ex-
traordinary measures to increase their attractiveness as mates for themselves
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or their surviving relatives. Furthermore, for a good Muslim in the ecological
environment of the Arabian Peninsula and with strict religious prohibitions
governing behavior, the promise of a resource-abundant environment in the
afterlife represents an attractive alternative, which could greatly inºuence his
behavior in this world.
Although it might not occur to those who study this problem through a
purely social lens, in one sense Islamic fundamentalist terrorism may be con-
sidered a non-alpha-male mating strategy. It offers non-alpha males without
females, and with little hope of marriage, an opportunity to increase their so-
cial status and achieve sexual gratiªcation in the afterlife.48
Of course, suicide terrorism does not contribute to the suicide bomber’s ac-
tual ªtness in this life—obviously, it ends it. It is, above all, the faith of an
Islamic fundamentalist terrorist in the afterlife that may encourage him to un-
dertake a suicide mission. As a captured attempted suicide bomber, ªfteen-
year-old Jalal, told Anat Berko: “There are 72 virgins, and Allah lets me marry
72 virgins. There are a lot of things I can’t describe. . . . I’ll ªnd everything in
paradise, a river of honey, a river of beer and alcohol, and anyway there are a
lot of rivers in paradise.”49 Sheikh Raid from Umm al-Fahm, identiªed as the
“most prominent Palestinian cleric in Israel . . . asserted in no uncertain terms
in an interview to . . . Ha’aretz, that he ‘had proof’ that the story of the virgins
was true” because it is documented in the Koran and sunna.50 He noted that
the shaheed “received from Allah six special gifts, including 70 [sic] virgins, no
torment in the grave, and the choice of 70 members of his family and his
conªdants to enter Paradise with him.”51 According to terrorism scholar
Raphael Israeli, a sixteen-year-old Muslim youth leader stated, “Most boys
cannot stop thinking about the virgins.”52
Beneªts also accrue to the family of the shaheed. From the life sciences’ per-
spective, the shaheed’s action contributes to inclusive ªtness: like others,
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shaheeds sacriªce and seek rewards not only for themselves but also for their
genetic relatives as well. The Muslim suicide terrorist knows that he and his
family may be venerated for his action. His mother, for example, will be ex-
alted by members of her community and known as Um-Shaheed, the mother of
a shaheed. As one mother explained, “I have special status with Allah. I get a lot
of respect from people. I get money, not just for my studies, but for travel, for
research, for everything I do. People help a lot when they hear I’m a shaheed’s
mother.”53
Also, the terrorist’s act of committing suicide may increase the prestige of
his siblings, increasing their marriage prospects. Terrorist organizations or
their sympathizers often pay a reward to a successful shaheed’s family, allow-
ing the family greater means to pay bride dower.54 For example, the sole ter-
rorist survivor from the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Ajmal Kasab, age twenty-one,
confessed that “he had joined Lashkar-e-Taiba [the terrorist organization re-
sponsible for the attacks] at the urging of his father, who said he would earn a
lot of money and would ‘give us some of the money, too, and we won’t be
poor anymore. Your brothers and sisters will be able to get married.’”55 Per-
haps most important, the hadith promises that the shaheed may save seventy
members of his family from the tortures of the grave and admit them directly
to paradise.56
If reproductive success is the benchmark of biological ªtness, then in the
Islamic context, suicide terrorism is a means toward achieving that success be-
cause of the increased status given to surviving relatives. There are, however,
two theological quandaries often glossed over by Islamic religious authorities:
Can shaheeds or shaheedas (female suicide terrorists) have children in paradise?
And do the shaheeds or shaheedas believe that they can? Regardless, the promo-
tion of suicide terrorism within a religiously credible context helps alpha
males to secure their dominant position in the social hierarchy, ensure that
threatening out-groups face violence, and dampen the inevitable social insta-
bility of a polygynous society. From the perspective of the life sciences, Islamic
fundamentalist suicide terrorism has an identiªable logic and so, in the
Islamic context, can be seen as an understandable choice for a young man or
woman.
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Obstructed Marriage Markets and Islamic Terrorism
Marriage markets are obstructed not only because of polygyny but also be-
cause of rapidly increasing dowry prices across the Islamic world. Delayed
marriage has become a new norm in the Middle East. For example, in Egypt,
one study documents that families of young adult males must save ªve to
seven years to pay for their sons’ marriages. From 2000 to 2004, wedding costs
in Egypt rose 25 percent. As a result, the average marriage age for Egyptian
men has risen sharply, from the early twenties to the late twenties and early
thirties. In one study, nearly 25 percent of young adult males in Egypt had not
married by age twenty-seven; the average age was thirty-one.57 In poverty-
stricken Afghanistan, wedding costs for young men average $12,000–$20,000.58
In Saudi Arabia, men usually are unable to marry before age twenty-nine; of-
ten they marry only in their mid-thirties.59 In Iran, 38 percent of twenty-ªve-
year-old to twenty-nine-year-old men are unmarried.60 Across the Middle
East, only about 50 percent of twenty-ªve-year-old to twenty-nine-year-old
men are married, the lowest percentage for this group in the developing
world.61 Whether in Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, or the United Arab Emirates,
the exorbitant costs of marriage have delayed the age at which Muslim men
marry. Polygyny, practiced almost exclusively by men with means, has been a
strong contributing factor in the rise of dower costs for the rest of the men in
society and has increased the competition for available women.
Commentators have lamented the emergence of a new class of “old maids”
(‘unoussa), young adult men who cannot afford to marry and feel both
ashamed and emasculated. In Islamic society, as in most societies, full
manhood is achieved only when a male marries and becomes head of the
household. Unmarried men are considered adolescents, dependents of their
parents. Because marriage is also a religious obligation for Muslims, the repro-
ductive failure of sons is catastrophic for their families. The resulting social
pressures facing these men are enormous. As Diane Singerman puts it, “If
young people remain in this liminal state between child and adult, ªnancially
dependent on their families and morally obligated to them far longer than
International Security 34:4 54
57. Diane Singerman, “The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities
among Youth in the Middle East,” Working Paper, No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Youth
Initiative, September 2007), pp. 4, 13.
58. Kirk Semple, “Big Weddings Bring Afghans Joy, and Debt,”New York Times, January 14, 2008.
59. Singerman, “The Economic Imperatives of Marriage,” p. 25.
60. Michael Slackman, “Stiºed, Egypt’s Young Turn to Islamic Fervor,” New York Times, February
17, 2008.
61. Ibid.
previous generations, then it is not surprising that social, moral, and political
tension is mounting.”62
One Egyptian commentator notes that these young men are seeking danger-
ous jobs: “The youth are seeking death. They’re already dead at home.”63
Singerman comments, “We can infer that the notion that they are ‘already
dead at home’ refers to both their ªnancial situation, their political exclusion,
and their unmarried status.”64 And as we have shown, evolutionary insight
tells us that reproductive failure in a biological sense can aggravate this des-
peration. This situation offers Islamist movements an opportunity they have
been able to exploit successfully. In a way, conditions created by Islamic cul-
ture (i.e., high levels of gender differentiation, prevalent polygyny, religious
sanction for suicide, and obstructed marriage markets) could not be more op-
portune for the growth and spread of terrorist organizations. The journalist
Michael Slackman notes, “Here in Egypt and across the Middle East, many
young people are being forced to put off marriage, the gateway to independ-
ence, sexual activity, and social respect. . . . In their frustration, the young are
turning to religion for solace and purpose, pulling their parents and their gov-
ernments with them.”65 One Egyptian young man states, “Sometimes, I can see
how it [this frustration] does not make you closer to God, but pushes you to-
ward terrorism. Practically, it killed my ambition. I can’t think of a future.”66
Delayed marriage and, more important, complete reproductive failure are
common elements exploited by groups seeking young adult men interested in
redressing the injustice they feel on a personal level, by force if necessary.
Singerman notes, “To mobilize supporters, there were many reports of radi-
cal Islamist groups in Egypt in the 1990s arranging extremely low-cost mar-
riages among the group’s members.”67 This strategy is a double-edged sword,
however. It is exceedingly difªcult to convince a married Muslim man with at
least one healthy young son still in need of his protection to commit suicide.
His masculinity and his religious beliefs converge in the person of that boy,
and that father will not want to fail his obligations as a Muslim man. Various
organizations that track the demographic characteristics of Palestinian suicide
terrorists ªnd that there was only one father with a son among them, and that
man’s only son was handicapped. Indeed, terrorists have shown the ability of
household formation to defuse terrorism. When the Palestinian Liberation
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Organization wanted to rein in a more militant wing in the 1970s, the Black
September organization, it did so by marrying its members off in the hope they
would produce sons. When the men married, and especially when they had
sons, their militancy waned dramatically.68 More recently, “Hamas leaders
have turned to matchmaking, bringing together single ªghters and widows,
and providing dowries and wedding parties for the many here who cannot af-
ford such trappings of matrimony.”69 In other words, Hamas is taking the pool
of recently available women and marrying them off, complete with dower, to
its ªghters. It is possible that Hamas is seeking to reduce internal tensions.
At the same time, this strategy will not increase the pool of available suicide
terrorists.70
Middle East governments have also noted the power of this approach. The
government of the United Arab Emirates makes low-cost marriage loans to
young men. The Egyptian government offers mass weddings for hundreds of
couples at a time, to cut costs.71 Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
likewise proposed a national “Love Fund” of more than $1 billion to facilitate
marriage among its young men.72 The Saudi government pays dower costs for
its soldiers. Not only terrorists but also governments have used the lure of re-
productive success to shape the direction taken by its young adult males. Be-
cause polygyny reduces the number of women available for such marriages,
governments are now looking with new and less tolerant eyes on that ancient
practice.
Recommendations
While life science insights may assist scholars of terrorism to better identify the
causes of Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism, they also aid in the devel-
opment of potential solutions. Our analysis yields four recommendations to
counter suicide terrorism in the Islamic context. These recommendations are
based on the logic of our arguments, and although we are not in a position to
conduct ªeld experiments of their effectiveness, we believe that they should be
seriously considered and researched by those tasked with countering Islamic
suicide terrorism.
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The ªrst recommendation is to promote women’s rights in the Muslim
world. The promotion of women’s rights dampens levels of gender differentia-
tion in society, which reduces the strength of painful motivators of suicide ter-
rorism such as dishonor and emasculation. It also requires the creation of
societal templates of conºict resolution that eschew violence. Research shows
that the peacefulness of nations is strongly and negatively correlated with
the level of violence against women in society. Speciªcally, when society’s
male members develop ways of relating to women other than through physi-
cal dominance and violence, and when women begin to take coordinated ac-
tion to dampen the most oppressive features of their society, positive change
will spread to broader social realms, and even affect interstate relations.73 Ad-
ditionally, steps to reduce the stark economic vulnerability of women, such
as the creation of microªnance programs, can contribute to this broader effort.
This change must come from within the Islamic world. As the United States
has learned when trying to export democracy, some efforts must have local
roots to be sustainable. This applies to the treatment of women, as well. Yet it
cannot be overlooked that all Islamic countries have signed the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)—
some with reservations (Saudi Arabia) and some without (Afghanistan). All
Muslim countries have active women’s organizations that have pushed for
the lifting of reservations and full implementation of CEDAW norms. The
existence of CEDAW, and the Islamic countries’ accessions to it, show that
women’s rights need not be construed as a purely Western ideological con-
struct. The international community must lend culturally appropriate assis-
tance to governments or other entities in the Muslim Middle East to advance
progress on CEDAW implementation.
Furthermore, international norms of women’s rights already prohibit polyg-
yny, and this point should be raised to a higher proªle in international human
rights discourse. Although most Muslim countries are unlikely to prohibit po-
lygyny outright, as Tunisia has done, some (including Morocco) have erected
stiff legal obstacles to this practice by requiring ofªcial judicial consent, the
ªrst wife’s written permission for her husband to take another wife, and dem-
onstration of the man’s ability to provide full equal economic support for all
wives prior to entering another marriage, as well as making it harder for men
to divorce polygynous wives.74
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Also, women must have the right to control their own reproduction. Em-
powered women have fewer children and invest more in the children they do
have. We predict that it is higher-birth-order sons, who have little hope of their
families accumulating enough resources to ever contract marriage for them,
who are prime fodder for terrorist groups promising them virginal brides in
heaven. Because to date there have been so few consilient efforts to understand
terrorism, we can ªnd no database with information on the birth order of sui-
cide terrorists. We predict, however, that with smaller families will come a
smaller population of such vulnerable young men.
Our second recommendation is that Muslim Middle Eastern nations must
begin to control dower costs. Innovative approaches, such as government pay-
ment of wedding costs or government provision of low-cost housing for new-
lyweds, should be promoted. Governments should minimize concerns among
their young adult men that they will be complete reproductive failures. These
men must be given a tangible stake in society by tying their manhood to famil-
ial responsibilities. Governments should facilitate this tie by helping to ease
their societies’ constricted marriage markets, using policy approaches adapted
from other Islamic nations, such as Egypt. Furthermore, the promotion of non-
permanent marriages does not, from an evolutionary standpoint, ameliorate
militancy, and therefore, for example, the practice of Hezbollah facilitating
mutaamarriages for young adults in its communities in Lebanon must begin to
be seen by the Lebanese government as the threat it represents.75
Third, building democratic, liberal governments in the Middle East is crit-
ical, not only because it coincides with advancing women’s rights but also
because constitutional democracy ensures that the rights of individuals are
protected. In addition, religious authority will be subordinate to the rule
of democratically established law, and this will promote an alternative form of
government than that offered by the Islamic fundamentalists. Effective dem-
ocracy is much more than procedural democracy, however. It means instilling
key elements of liberalism in the governments of the Muslim Middle East.
These elements include economic, social, and political freedom, including free-
dom of conscience, speech, assembly, and the press; the rule of law and an in-
dependent judiciary; and respect for individual rights and human dignity.
These changes will require several generations to accomplish. Naturally, this
process will be arduous and take time, and there will be setbacks. But we must
not lose perspective: human history is replete with examples of resistance to
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such transformations, whether in Great Britain and the United States, Europe
and Japan, East Asia and Latin America, and now the Middle East.
Building effective democracy in the Middle East will cause signiªcant eco-
nomic, political, and social changes—the rise of individualism, democratic po-
litical processes, capitalism, women’s rights—which will, in turn, weaken the
message of the terrorists and their ability to retain their membership and at-
tract new members. Effective democracy will also provide a social leveling
force, yielding more opportunity and more equitable social conditions over
time that will provide other paths to high social status, and thus marriage op-
portunities and well-being for relatives. Democracy usually carries with it
freer, more open markets, which might also provide an economically viable al-
ternative to terrorism for some individuals. Efforts to promote effective de-
mocracy in the Middle East, however, must be made on a case-by-case basis, so
as not to destabilize existing regimes, which could lead to increased violence
and anarchy. But here again, the messengers must be Muslims. Muslim liberal
reformers in the Islamic world can be considered antiterrorist allies in this
endeavor—from Morocco to Indonesia and from Turkey to Pakistan.
Fourth, the attractiveness of the terrorists’ message must be combated di-
rectly through propaganda that taps into the more primal motivations of po-
tential suicide terrorists, as identiªed by the life sciences—individual and
inclusive ªtness. Our analysis suggests how competing messages may be tai-
lored to accomplish this. We cannot address which medium would be most ef-
fective, but it is vital that these messages come from Arab outlets to increase
the chances of acceptance. The ªrst step is to promote the message that “the
family” is the Muslim community, not the terrorist group, and that there is no
justiªcation in the Koran or hadith to kill other family members, as Islamic
fundamentalist terrorists have done. As one report put it, “If the seeds of
doubt can be planted in the mind of al-Qaida’s strategic leadership that an at-
tack would be viewed as a shameful murder of innocents . . . then the order
may not be given.”76 Indeed, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group has recently
written a 417-page document that “corrects” the common view of jihad and of-
fers ethical boundaries. For example, “Jihad has ethics and morals because it is
for God. That means it is forbidden to kill women, children, elderly people,
priests, messengers, traders and the like. Betrayal is prohibited and it is vital to
keep promises and treat prisoners of war in a good way. Standing by those eth-
ics is what distinguishes Muslims’ jihad from the wars of other nations.”77 This
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type of reform movement from within the jihadist community must be publi-
cized and praised.
Additionally, public messages should emphasize that terrorists seduce indi-
viduals away from their true familial obligations, and this is un-Islamic and
dishonorable. Shame is a powerful personal tool to combat the ideology of
the terrorists. The message might be: “Osama bin Laden is a deadbeat dad
who never took care of his many children,” or “A suicide terrorist is a son who
failed his mother and father and gave them no grandson to cheer their old
age,” or “Awoman suicide terrorist would contribute more to the cause by be-
ing a wife and mother. If she does not choose this noble path, maybe she has
something to hide.” Shaming themes within the context of family obligation,
indicating that a suicide terrorist is not a real man, because a real man would
have raised a son for his family in this life, would be a very important element
in this cultural context. As recently noted, “The [U.S.] government is seeking
ways to amplify the voices of respected religious leaders who warn that sui-
cide bombers will not enjoy the heavenly delights promised by terrorist litera-
ture, and that their families will be dishonored by such attacks.”78
Another possibility would be to draw from Islamic cultural sources a com-
peting, negative message about suicide terrorists based on themes that would
intersect with the hypervigilance concerning masculinity noted previously. If
masculinity can rightfully be called into question for the suicide terrorist, this
competing message may be an effective deterrent. We do not suggest this ap-
proach lightly: our life sciences analysis leads us to believe that many young
men may ªnd themselves caught in a no-win cultural trap where they become
susceptible to arguments promoting suicide. Although this competing mes-
sage relies on shaming themes, if shame leads fewer young men to take their
own lives and the lives of others, it is well worth considering, for all of these
lives (including the life of the suicide terrorist recruit) have value. In this com-
peting, culturally based message, the implication could be that the suicide ter-
rorist must have mental troubles, be physically disªgured, or have some other
problem that calls into question his sexual desirability and manliness; other-
wise he would have chosen the path of true manhood and family. The message
would be that only young men who are not attractive to women—sexual
undesirables—choose to become suicide terrorists. The cultural message of re-
productive success in this life as the measure of a true man in Islamic society
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can serve to turn around the perverse logic of the illusory reproductive “suc-
cess” of suicide. If a man must view his choice to be a suicide terrorist as a
public admission of being a sexual undesirable, this may taint the suicidal path
with a deep shame founded in culturally based fears of emasculation, and thus
be an effective deterrent.79
The media can play a key role in this strategy. Governments worldwide
should put pressure on their media not to lionize suicide terrorists or to pro-
vide their surviving relatives the opportunity to praise their actions. Rather,
when suicide terrorism occurs, shaming themes based on the perpetrator’s not
being an honorable son or being unattractive to women or being somehow so-
cially defective would be profoundly discouraging to would-be terrorists. If
the choice to become a suicide terrorist is simultaneously viewed as a choice to
publicly announce that a man is not manly (or a woman has something
to hide), this may become an effective deterrent. We also offer two corollaries
to this approach. One corollary would be to allow marriage and conjugal visits
for jailed terrorists, which might help to curb recidivism, especially if male off-
spring are the result of these visits. The second would be to develop new reha-
bilitation and jobs programs in the Middle East for the disabled and the
handicapped to give them hope in this life and not just in the afterlife.
These recommendations would require time to implement, but this should
not discourage countries facing the threat of Islamic fundamentalist suicide
terrorism. The threat is a long-term one, and so future-oriented policies must
be implemented. Moreover, signiªcant social change is sometimes possible
quickly. For example, the modern women’s rights movement in the West is just
forty years old, and most change has come in the last twenty years.
Conclusion
A potent mix of social science and life science factors—international anarchy,
U.S. intervention in Islamic nations, the approbation of suicide in Islamic
scripture, very high levels of gender differentiation, religious support for
polygyny, and obstructed marriage markets leading to signiªcantly delayed
marriage prospects for young Muslim men in the Middle East—has contrib-
uted to the rise of Islamic suicide terrorism. Insights from the life sciences
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cannot replace those from the social sciences. Still, we believe that our investi-
gation has shown the value added of incorporating work from the life sciences
to help explain Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism and craft policy initia-
tives to combat it.
Insights from the life sciences complement those from the social sciences,
and it is vital to integrate all of the knowledge on human behavior available to
us. Indeed, a consilient approach demands the collection of data about phe-
nomena that might not otherwise be considered important to evaluate, such as
tracking dower costs longitudinally or noting the birth order of suicide terror-
ists. This additional information, coupled with insights provided by the con-
silient approach, may lead to more effective policies for addressing problems
such as suicide terrorism. Consilience represents an important path forward
for scholars and policymakers alike.
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